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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SALT LAKE CITY, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
DAVID LEE MCCLAIN 
Defendant/Appellant, 
Case No. 950173-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Article VIII, 
Section 5 of the Utah Constitution, and by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(f)(1994) which permits a defendant in a circuit court criminal 
action to Appeal to the Court of Appeals for reversal of a final 
judgment and conviction for any crime other that first degree or 
capital felony. 
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The pertinent parts of the following statues are provided in 
Addenda: 
Salt Lake City Code § 12.24.100 
Salt Lake City Code § 12.52.350 
Salt Lake City Code § 12.52.360 
Art. I, Sec. 7, Utah Constitution 
Amend. V, United States Constitution 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1.. Did the trial judge's denial of defendant's request for a 
short recess which would allow the defendant to present an 
important witness violate the defendant's right to due process? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW. A trial judge's decision to deny a 
request for a recess shall only be overturned if it was an abuse of 
discretion. Beverly v. Cardinal , 743 P.2d 442, 443 (Colo.App. 
1987); Elliot v. Kundahl, 574 P.2d 732, 734 (Wash. 1978); 
Slavenburcr v. Bautts, 561 P.2d 423, 426 (Kan. 1977). 
This issued was preserved below. R. 134-36, 188-91. 
2. Did the trial judge's denial of defendant's request to reopen 
his case to present an important witness violate the defendant's 
right to due process? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW. A trial judge's decision to deny a 
request to reopen a party's case will only be overturned if it was 
an abuse of discretion. Gardner v. Christensen, 622 P.2d 782, 784 
(Utah 1980). 
This issue was preserved below. R. 188-91. 
3. Did the trial judge used the incorrect standard in determining 
whether to include the defendant's lesser included instruction? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW. A trial court's refusal to give a lesser 
included instruction is a question of law, and will be reviewed for 
correctness, giving no particular deference to the trial court. 
State v. Diaz, 859 P.2d 19, 24 (Utah App. 1993); State v. Hamilton, 
827 P.2d 232, 238 (Utah 1992). 
This issue was preserved below. R. 185-187. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
On February 15, 1995, a jury found the defendant guilty on 
four counts: (1) Driving under the influence in violation of Salt 
Lake City Code § 12.24.100, (2) Driving on a divided section in 
violation of Salt Lake City Code § 12.44.110, (3) Improper lane 
change in violation of Salt Lake City Code § 12.44.060, and (4) 
Open Container of alcohol in a vehicle in violation of Salt Lake 
City Code § 12.44.070. Index of Proceedings. The defendant was 
sentenced and judgment was entered on the same day. Index of 
Proceedings. On March 7, 1995, the defendant filed his notice of 
appeal of these convictions. Other facts relevant to this section 
are stated elsewhere in the brief. See infra Statement of the 
Facts. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On September 10th, 1994 at approximately 11:00 p.m., Officer 
Kenneth D. Dailey, Jr. ("Officer Dailey") and Officer Roger Kent 
Williams, while on motorcycles, spotted a vehicle driving 
southbound on State Street. R. 81-83. At approximately 1930 
South, they observed the vehicle make a U-turn across a raised 
island, go into the mid-lane and then back into the inside lane. 
R. 83. The vehicle then drove up onto the island and back down 
before entering the left turn lane for Coatsville Avenue. R. 84. 
The vehicle did not turn immediately, even though the officers did 
not observe anything preventing the driver from doing so. R. 86. 
The vehicle then turned in front of the oncoming car, causing the 
3 
car to slow down. R. 87. The officers activated their lights and 
followed the vehicle. R. 88. After a quarter of a block, the 
officers engaged their sirens. R. 148. The vehicle pulled over 
near the end of the block. R. 88. 
Officer Dailey approached the driver, David McClain("Mr. 
McClain"). R. 90. Officer Dailey testified that he smelled the 
strong odor of alcohol and that Mr. McClain's speech was slurred. 
R. 90-91. Officer Dailey also noted that Mr. McClain swayed 
continuously and that his eyes were red and watery and his pupils 
were large. R. 90-91 
Officer Dailey attempted to administer field sobriety test, 
but Mr. McClain was unable to do them. R. 95-99. A couple of open 
containers of beer were found in the vehicle, and Mr. McClain 
admitted to drinking one beer. R. 91, 143. Mr. McClain refused to 
take the breathalyzer test. R. 100-01. 
Mr. McClain testified that he has diabetes and that he was 
suffering from low blood sugar at the time. R. 157-62. He stated 
that low blood sugar cause him to be disoriented, that he gets 
shaky, that he starts to slur his speech and that sometimes he even 
goes unconscious. R. 158. He also stated that the reason he 
refused the breathalyzer test was that he was afraid it would 
register the medication he takes for diabetes. R. 161. Mr. 
McClain does not know how the open containers of beer got in his 
car. R. 160. He used to lend his car out and speculates that one 
of his friends put them in the car. R. 160-61. However, he said 
that his medication had never affected his driving before. R. 162. 
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Mr. McClain's physician, Dr. Edwards, agreed to testify on 
behalf of Mr. McClain. R. 189-90. Dr. Edwards was going to 
testify that Mr. McClain has diabetes and the low blood sugar can 
cause disorientation and slurred speech and can affect the motor 
skills of the afflicted person. R. 190. However, Dr. Edwards 
could only come in to testify at 4:00 in the afternoon. R. 189-90. 
The defense finished with all of its available evidence at 
about 3:10 p.m. The trial court refused to wait until 4:00 p.m. so 
the defendant could present Dr. Edwards as a witness. R. 171. 
Counsel for the defense objected, but the court made it clear that 
it would not wait, so the defense rested. R. 190-91. Dr. Edwards 
arrived during the reading of the jury instructions. R. 191. 
Counsel for the defense again requested that he be given a chance 
to put Dr. Edwards on the stand. R. 188, 191. The court rejected 
this request. R. 186-87. 
The court also refused Defendant's request for a lesser 
included instruction for Reckless Driving. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial judge abused her discretion, when she denied Mr. 
McClain's request for a recess of less than an hour in order for 
him to present a witness that was critical to his defense. Mr. 
McClain's ability to adequately defend himself and to be given a 
fair trial were compromised by the trial court's decision. This is 
especially true in light of the reasonableness of the request. Mr. 
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McClain's need for this witness was great and his request was 
minimal. Mr. McClain's recess should have been granted. 
It was a further abuse of discretion for the trial judge to 
have denied Mr. McClain's request to reopen his case to present the 
testimony of that same witness. The request was reasonable, and 
the trial judge's actions denied Mr. McClain the right to a fair 
trial. 
Finally, the trial judge improperly denied Mr. McClain's 
lesser included instruction for the offense of reckless driving. 
The trial judge used the improper "necessarily included" standard 
in deciding this question. Under the proper "evidence based" 
standard Mr. McClain's lesser included instruction should have been 
included. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL JUDGE'S DENIAL OF MR. MCCLAIN'S REQUEST FOR A SHORT 
RECESS IN ORDER FOR HIM TO PRESENT AN IMPORTANT WITNESS 
VIOLATED HIS RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL AND TO DUE PROCESS. 
Mr. McClain's right to a fair trial was violated, when he was 
prevented from calling an important witness and forced to close his 
case early. A person shall not "be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law." U.S. Const, amend. V. ; Utah 
Const. Art. I, § 7. An important part of due process of law, and 
the right to a fair trial, is "an opportunity to defend." State v. 
Maestas, 815 P.2d 1319, 1325 (Utah App. 1991); Provo City v. 
Werner, 810 P. 2d 469, 472 (Utah App. 1991) . The defendant was 
denied this opportunity to defend when the trial court denied the 
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defendant's request for a short recess in order for the defendant 
to present an essential witness to his case, and the defendant was 
forced to rest his case early. 
A. Mr. McClain's request for a delay in the trial was in the 
nature of a recess and not a continuance 
The review of a trial court's decision involving a request for 
a recess, as opposed to a continuance is an issue of first 
impression in this state. 
Black's Law Dictionary defines recess as: 
In the practice of the courts, a short interval or 
period of time during which the court suspends business, 
but without adjourning. The period between sessions of 
court. A temporary [adjournment] of a trial or a hearing 
that occurs after a trial or hearing has commenced. 
State v. Charles, La., 350 So.2d 595, 598. 
1269 (6th ed. 1990). 
Black's Law Dictionary defines recess as: 
The adjournment or postponement of a session, hearing, 
trial, or other proceeding to a subsequent day or time; 
usually on the request or motion of one of the parties. 
321 (6th ed. 1990). 
Mr. McClain's request in this case is in the nature of a 
recess and not a request for a continuance. Mr. McClain finished 
testifying on his own behalf at 3:10 p.m. R. 171, 190. Mr. 
McClain's next witness Dr. Edwards was not going to be present to 
testify until 4:00 p.m. R. 134-35, 188-91. At this point, Mr. 
McClain requested a delay of the trial of only fifty minutes. R. 
135, 171. This request was for a short interval. The request came 
after the trial had commenced, and the request did not require an 
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adjournment to another day. Because of its temporary nature, the 
delay requested would have to be considered a recess rather than a 
continuance. 
The granting of a continuance is at the discretion of the 
trial judge. State v. Creviston, 646 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 1982) . 
And a trial judge's decision regarding a continuance will not be 
reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion. Id. 
The defendant concedes that the granting of a recess should 
also be at the discretion of the trial judge. Beverly v. Cardinal, 
743 P. 2d 442, 443 (Colo.App. 1987); Elliot v. Kundahl, 574 P. 2d 
732, 734 (Wash. 1978); Slavenburg v. Bautts, 561 P.2d 423, 426 
(Kan. 1977). 
Whether a trial judge abused his discretion should be looked 
at more closely when a fundamental right is at issue. People v. 
Spears, 474 N.E.2d 1189, 1190 (N.Y. 1984). And when it is found 
that a trial judge's discretionary decision denies the defendant a 
constitutional right, that decision should always be considered an 
abuse of discretion. Employers Insurance of Wausau v. Horton, 797 
S.W.2d 677, 680 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1990). Mr. McClain was denied 
his constitutional right to due process. 
Further, what is required to find an abuse of discretion 
should be lower for a request for a recess, than that required for 
a continuance. This request would not have required the court to 
reschedule any other matters. A short recess places less of a 
burden on the court" than a continuation of the trial to another 
day. 
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The chance of any prejudice to the opposing party is also 
unlikely when a short recess is requested. Mr. McClain requested 
a recess of less than an hour. A 50 minute recess would not have 
caused any prejudice to the city. The city would not be required 
to re-subpoena any witnesses. The city's witnesses would not have 
had to take any additional time off. And it is highly unlikely 
that any possible rebuttal witnesses7 memories would have faded as 
the result of a fifty minute recess. 
The reason given for the denial by the trial judge, that the 
jury would be required to serve longer is only speculative. It is 
possible that the testimony of Dr. Edwards could have made the 
jury's deliberation easier. Dr. Edward's testimony could have 
shortened the jury's deliberation, thereby shortening their time of 
service. So one can not say that the recess would have required 
the jury to serve any longer. An at most it would have caused them 
to serve only fifty more minutes.1 The jury served for two hours, 
from 4:15 p.m. to 6:15 p.m. R. 58. 
This was not a request for time so Mr. McClain could try and 
find a speculative witness, who may not even show up. The witness 
was identified, and he was going to be present to testify at the 
end of the requested recess. And he was available to testify at 
the time the requested recess would have ended. 
1
 The time that would have been required for Dr. Edwards to 
testify should not be counted against the defendant. If Dr. 
Edwards had been available to testify at 3:10 p.m., any denial of 
Dr. Edwards' testimony because it would have delayed the trial 
would have most certainly been an abuse of discretion. Therefore, 
it is the time of the recess and not the time that it would have 
taken Dr. Edward's to testify which is at issue. 
9 
While a trial court should try to keep a trial running in an 
orderly fashion, this should not be done at the expense of justice. 
Rutzen v. Pertile, 527 N.E.2d 603, 608 (Ill.App. 2 Dist. 1988). 
The court's goal at trial should be the search for truth, not that 
the trial finish at five o'clock sharp. Great Plains Supply Co. v. 
Erickson, 398 N.W. 732, 734 (N.D. 1986) . The court should not 
create "an appearance of unfairness" by rushing to judgment. 
Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Horton, 797 S.W.2d 677, 681 (Tex.App.-
Texarkana 1990) . 
While the decision to grant a recess is an issue of first 
impression in Utah, several other jurisdictions have dealt with the 
issue. In those cases it was found to be an abuse of discretion to 
not grant a short recess to allow a witness to testify. Slavenburv 
v. Bautts, 561 P. 2d 423 (Kan. 1977) (Abuse of discretion, in an 
automobile negligence case, to not grant a recess to allow 
defendant's medical witness to testify); Elliot v. Kundahl, 574 
P.2d 732 (Wash. 1978)(In a wrongful death action, it was an abuse 
of discretion to deny a recess of 75 minutes so plaintiff could 
present a medical expert); Beverly v. Cardinal, 743 P.2d 442 
(Colo.App. 1987)(Abuse of discretion in automobile negligence 
action when trial court denied a recess of less than two hours to 
allow the defendant to present a witness subpoenaed for later in 
the day); Simon v. Goldberg, 332 N.Y.S.2d 214 (1972)(Abuse of 
discretion to deny a recess from 11:15 a.m. to 2:00 p.m., so 
treating physicians could testify); O'Malley v. City of New York, 
229 N.Y.2d 489 (1962) (Abuse of discretion to not grant a recess for 
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a reasonable time to allow a medical examiner, who was on his way, 
to testify); Photo 60 of Miami International v. Roundtree, 541 
So.2d 687 (Fla.App. 3 Dist. 1989); see also, Jarvis v. Stoddart, 
213 N.Y.S. 829 (1926); Herbert v. Garner, 78 So.2d 729 (Fla 1955); 
Pepe v. Urban, 78 A.2d 406 (N.J. 1951). 
As in Mr. McClain's case, almost all the witnesses in the 
above cases were doctors. The Supreme Court of Kansas noted the 
dilemma created by doctors as witness. "The expert medical 
witness. . . is often engulfed in a demanding professional practice 
which because of tight schedules and unforeseeable emergencies, 
makes it difficult to appear at a time convenient to court and 
counsel. Slavenburg, at 427. Just because doctors are difficult 
to schedule should not mean that the courts should move heaven and 
earth to accommodate them. However, because of these difficulties, 
reasonable requests, involving what time they are allowed to 
testify at, should be granted. 
The Supreme Court of Kansas in dealing with the issue of 
whether a trial court should grant a recess so a witness could 
testify, developed several factors that a court should weigh in 
making this decision. 
(1) Counsel's diligence and effort to gain 
attendance of the witness; (2) the reason the witness is 
not present; (3) the nature of the witness's expected 
testimony; (4) whether the testimony is critical evidence 
or merely cumulative; (5) the amount of delay expected; 
(6) the effect of the delay on the docket of the trial 
court; and (7) the overall injustice which might result 
if the delay were denied. 
Slavenburg, at 428. 
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(1) and (2) Counsel for Mr. McClain had arranged to have Dr. 
Edwards to be present at trial, granted it was at 4:00 p.m. 
Counsel proffered to the court, that he had informed Dr. Edward's 
that he would be testifying in the afternoon. Dr. Edward's told 
counsel that he would not be able to testify until 4:00 p.m. 
Counsel did not subpoena Dr. Edwards. R. 134, 189-90. However 
Dr. Edwards was a willing witness, and counsel explained that to 
save his office(The Salt Lake Legal Defender Association) expense 
he did not have him subpoenaed. R. 190. 
A subpoena is not required even for a motion to continue. 
Just a showing that the witness could actually be produced and that 
counsel exercised due diligence is all that is needed. State v. 
Creviston, 646 P. 2d 750, 752 (Utah 1982) A subpoena may help prove 
that but so could other facts. In this case Counsel proffered to 
the court that Dr. Edwards would be available at 4:00 p.m. R. 134 
And in fact, Dr. Edwards did arrive prior to 4:00 p.m. R. 18 8, 
191. The lack of a subpoena should also be weighed against the 
type of request. Mr. McClain only asked for a short recess, not a 
continuance to another day. Further, any possible error in 
judgment by counsel in not subpoenaing Dr. Edwards does not justify 
the drastic measure taken by the trial court. See, Elliott v. 
Kundall, 574 P.2d 732 (Wash 1978). 
(3) Dr. Edward's was going to testify that Mr. McClain did 
indeed have diabetes. R. 190. And that a diabetic suffering from 
low blood sugar can become disoriented, have slurred speech and 
have trouble with his motor coordination. R. 190. 
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(4) Mr. McClain was charged with driving under the 
influence ("DUI") . Salt Lake City Code § 12.24.100. The defense 
presented by Mr. McClain, was that he was a diabetic, that he was 
suffering from low blood sugar, and it was the low blood sugar that 
caused him to behave the way he did and not alcohol. R. 162, 177-
82. Mr. McClain intended to present his personal physician, Dr. 
Edwards, who would have confirmed the Mr. McClain's diabetic 
condition. R. 190. Dr. Edwards would have also testified that low 
blood sugar causes systems similar to those suffered by someone 
under the influence. R. 190. Further, Dr. Edwards could have 
clarified whether the defendant's medication would have caused 
these symptoms. A person can be found guilty of a DUI on the basis 
that they were under the influence of medication. In this case, 
the issue of medication was extremely crucial. During 
deliberation, the jury sent a question to the judge asking if it 
was possible to find the defendant guilty of DUI on the basis of 
his medication. R. 23. This question from the jury strongly 
suggests that the defendant's conviction was based on the 
medication. Dr. Edward's testimony on the medication would have 
been crucial. 
(5) The amount of delay expected is the most important 
factor, and it carries the most weight. The amount of delay 
expected was minimal. Only a recess of 50 minutes was requested. 
Even if the other factors do not weigh favorably for the defendant 
the fact that the requested recess was so short should off set any 
concerns. 
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(6) The requested recess would not have had any effect on the 
docket of the trial court. The only possible effect is that the 
trial may have been 50 minutes longer. 
(7) The overall injustice that resulted from the denial of 
the recess is that the defendant was prevented from presenting a 
crucial witness. Because of this the defendant was unable to fully 
present his defense and his right to due process was violated. 
Weighing the reasonableness of the request against Mr. 
McClain's due process right to present Dr. Edwards, the trial 
court's denial of the recess was an abuse of discretion. 
B. It was an abuse of discretion to deny Mr. McClain's 
requested recess even under the standards required for a 
continuance. 
Even if Mr. McClain's request was for a continuance rather 
than a recess, it still was an abuse of discretion to deny the 
request. The trial judge may be found to have abused her 
discretion in not granting a continuance, "where a party has made 
timely objections, given necessary notice and made a reasonable 
effort to have the trial date reset for good cause." State v. 
Crevistion, 646 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 1982) . When a criminal 
defendant requests a continuance in order to obtain the presence of 
a witness, the defendant "must show the testimony is material and 
admissible, that the witness could actually be produced, that the 
witness could be produced within a reasonable time, and that due 
diligence has been exercised before the request for a continuance. 
Id. 
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Mr. McClain made timely objections, gave reasonable notice and 
made a reasonable effort to have the trial delayed for good cause. 
Prior to the noon recess, Mr. McClain had made the trial judge 
aware that Dr. Edwards would not be able to testify until 4:00 p.m. 
R. 134. At this point in the trial the trial judge indicated that 
if the defendant had finished with his other witnesses close to 
4:00 p.m., the trial judge would be willing to take a short recess. 
R. 134. The trial judge further stated that if the defendant 
finished at 3:00 p.m. or earlier she would not be willing to delay 
the trial. At this point it was not clear when the defendant would 
be finished with all his witnesses except Dr. Edwards. However the 
trial judge was aware that a recess may be necessary. It was not 
until 3:10 p.m. when the defendant finished testifying that counsel 
and the trial judge knew a recess would need to take place if Dr. 
Edwards was going to testify. R. 171, 190. Under these 
circumstances Mr. McClain made timely objections, gave reasonable 
notice, and made a reasonable effort to have the trial delayed (not 
reset) for good cause. 
Dr. Edward's testimony would have been material. Testimony is 
material "if there is a reasonable probability that its presence 
would effect the outcome of the trial." State v. Schreuder, 712 
P. 2d 264, 275 (Utah 1985) . As argued earlier Dr. Edwards testimony 
was crucial to Mr. McClain7 s defense and would have added 
significant credibility. For the same reasons, Dr. Edward's 
testimony was relevant to the case and therefore admissible. 
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The city's only objection to Dr. Edward's testimony was that 
it would be cumulative. R. 188-89. Mr. McClain testified that he 
had diabetes and he stated what having low blood sugar would do to 
him. However, Mr. McClain is not a doctor. And Dr. Edwards would 
have added credibility to Mr. McClain's defense. In all the 
automobile negligence cases cited earlier, the parties could have 
testified to their own injuries. Yet medical experts were still 
considered material witnesses. 
And as argued earlier, Dr. Edwards could actually be produced 
and was in fact produced. And he could be produced in a reasonable 
time. In this case, less than an hour. And due diligence was 
exercised before the request for a continuance. 
II. IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO HAVE 
DENIED THE DEFENDANT'S REQUEST TO REOPEN HIS CASE TO PRESENT 
THE TESTIMONY OF DR. EDWARDS. 
It was an abuse of discretion for the trial judge to have 
denied Mr.McClain's request to reopen his case and present the 
testimony of Dr. Edwards. A trial judge has discretion in deciding 
whether to allow a party to reopen his case in order to present 
further evidence. Gardner v. Christensen, 622 P.2d 782, 784 (Utah 
1980) . "Nevertheless, such discretion may not be exercised in a 
capricious and arbitrary manner which produces an inequitable or 
unjust result." Id. 
After the defense had rested, the trial judge read the jury 
instructions. R. 190-91. Prior to finishing those instructions, 
Dr. Edwards arrived. R. 190-91 The trial judge finished the 
instructions at about 5 minutes to 4:00 p.m. R. 191. Defense 
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counsel approached the bench and requested that he be given an 
opportunity to reopen his case and let Dr. Edwards testify. R. 
172, 188. The trial judge denied the request. Counsels then 
proceeded to closing arguments. R. 188, 191. 
As argued earlier, on the issue of the trial judge's denial of 
defendant's request for a recess, the trial judge's denial of 
Mr.McClain's request to reopen his case, denied Mr. McClain an 
opportunity to present a crucial witness for his defense. In 
addition, no delay or recess was needed at this point. The 50 
minutes requested earlier were taken up by the reading of jury 
instructions. So the trial judges concern that the trial would be 
delayed was no longer an issue. 
The only concern of the trial judge at this point was that the 
prosecutor had released his witnesses and could not present any 
rebuttal to Dr. Edwards. R. 191. However the only witnesses that 
the prosecutor presented were two police officers. And considering 
what Dr. Edwards was going to testify to it is hard to conceive 
what the officer's could have said in rebuttal, since they are not 
medical experts. 
III. THE TRIAL JUDGE IMPROPERLY DENIED MR. MCCLAIN'S LESSER 
INCLUDED INSTRUCTION WHEN SHE USED THE INCORRECT STANDARD IN 
DETERMINING WHETHER MR. MCCLAIN WAS ENTITLED TO THAT 
INSTRUCTION. 
The trial judge denied Mr. McClain's lesser included 
instruction on the basis it did not fulfill the "necessarily 
included" standard, rather than the correct evidence based 
standard. State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983). Mr. McClain 
was charged with Driving under the influence of alcohol and/or 
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drugs. Mr. McClain requested a lesser included instruction on the 
offense of reckless driving. R. 186. Both offenses are provided 
for under the Salt Lake City Code. 
12.24.100. Driving Under the Influence of Drugs and 
Intoxicants prohibited. 
A. It is unlawful and punishable as provided in this 
section for any person to operate or be in actual physical 
control of a vehicle within this city . . . if the person is 
under the influence of alcohol or any drug, or the combined 
influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree which renders 
the person incapable of safely driving a vehicle within the 
city. 
Salt Lake City Code. 
12.52.350. Reckless Driving - Prohibited. 
Any person who drives any vehicle in wilful or wanton 
disregard for the safety of persons or property is guilty of 
reckless driving. 
Salt Lake City Code. 
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 
1983), clarified the appropriate standard for determining whether 
a defendant is entitled to a lesser included instruction. The 
Court found that there are two different standards for determining 
whether a court should include a lesser included instruction. The 
"necessarily included" standard, the more narrow of the two 
standards, requires that all the elements of the lesser standard be 
found in the greater charge. Jd. at 155. The lesser included 
charge can not include any elements not found in the greater 
charge. However, this standard only applies to lesser included 
instructions submitted by the prosecution. Id. at 156. This is 
because the defendant is entitled to notice of the elements against 
which he has to defend. The prosecution can not be allowed to 
bring in new elements in a lesser included instruction that the 
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defendant was not aware of previously. A different standard is to 
be applied to a defendant's request for a lesser included 
instruction. This standard requires that there be some overlap in 
the elements of the greater and lesser included charges, and that 
the evidence presented at trial provide "a rational basis for a 
verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and 
convicting him of the included offense." Id. at 158. 
The trial judge held that reckless driving was not a lesser 
included offense to DUI, because the reckless driving charge 
included an additional element. R. 187. The new element was the 
requirement of willful and wanton intent. This decision is 
obviously based on the "necessarily included" standard. Since it 
was the defendant's requested instruction, the trial judge should 
have used the "evidence based" standard. Id. 
While both offenses are punishable as class B misdemeanors, a 
DUI is a greater charge than reckless driving. DUI's have more 
substantial mandatory sentencing requirements. 12.24.100 (D), 
compare, 12.53.360. In addition, DUI's have collateral 
consequences including the possibility of enhancing any subsequent 
DUI conviction. 12.24.100(E); Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (5) , (6) , (7) 
(1953 as amended), compare, 12.53.360. So even though both charges 
are class B misdemeanors, the mandatory sentencing requirements, 
the possible collateral consequences, and any possible social 
stigma, make a DUI a greater charge than reckless driving. 
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Both offenses have overlapping elements. In both cases the 
prosecution would have to prove that the defendant was operating 
his vehicle in an unsafe manner. 
The evidence presented at trial provided a rational basis for 
a verdict acquitting the defendant of the DUI and convicting him 
of reckless driving. The trial judge is not supposed weigh the 
evidence, in making this determination, since that is for the trier 
of fact to decide. Baker, at 159. The trial judge only needs to 
determine "whether there is a sufficient quantum of evidence 
presented to justify sending the question to the jury." Jd. at 
159. Also if the evidence is ambiguous and subject to alternative 
interpretations, and one of those interpretations would include 
finding the defendant guilty of the lesser included instead of the 
greater offense, then that charge must be included as a lesser 
included instruction. JEd. The trial judge must view the evidence 
and the inferences that can be drawn in a light most favorable to 
the defendant when making this decision. State v. Velarde, 734 
P.2d 449, 451 (Utah 1986). 
There was plenty of evidence presented at trial that the 
defendant drove his vehicle in a unsafe manner. He made a u-turn 
across his lane and onto the divider. And he made a left turn in 
front of another vehicle. 
The main issue of contention at trial was what caused Mr. 
McClain's conduct. The prosecution argued that it was alcohol and 
or drugs that caused Mr. McClain's behavior. Mr. McClain however 
provided a reasonable explanation for his driving, that did not 
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include alcohol or drugs. And that explanation was his natural 
condition of being a diabetic, and that as part of that condition 
he was suffering from low blood sugar which caused him to drive 
erratically and to perform poorly on the field sobriety tests. 
And while low blood sugar would explain his driving pattern, 
it does not necessarily excuse Mr. McClain's conduct. The jury 
could have found that Mr. McClain should not have continued driving 
once he started to suffer from low blood sugar. On this basis the 
jury could have held that Mr. McClain continued to drive in a 
willful or wanton disregard for the safety of others. Therefore he 
was guilty of reckless driving. 
The evidence presented at trial, when looked at in a light 
most favorable to the defendant did provide a reasonable 
explanation for why the defendant was not guilty of DUI, but was 
guilty of reckless driving. And it appears that the jury had some 
question whether the defendant was guilty of a DUI. The jury asked 
whether the defendant could be found guilty based on his medication 
rather that alcohol. R. 23. The fact that they questioned whether 
alcohol was involved, suggests that they may have questioned the 
DUI, and may have gone for a reckless driving instruction. Because 
of this the trial judge should have included the defendant's 
requested instruction. 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT AND WRITTEN OPINION 
No Utah appellate court has yet addressed the issue of a trial 
court denying a defendant's request for a recess. The issue 
21 
involves Mr. McClain's important constitutional rights to due 
process and a fair trial. To provide guidance on how trials should 
be managed, especially regarding recess, Mr. McClain requests oral 
argument and a written opinion. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial judge abused her discretion when she prevented Mr. 
McClain from presenting a crucial witness to his defense, violating 
the defendant's right to due process and a fair trial. The trial 
judge abused her discretion when she denied the defendant's request 
for a short recess in order for him to present this witness. And 
she further abused her discretion when she denied the defendant an 
opportunity to reopen his case to present this witness to the jury. 
Finally, the trial judge erred when she denied the defendant's 
lesser included instruction on reckless driving. The trial judge 
used an incorrect standard in denying the instruction. And under 
the correct standard the instruction would have had to be included. 
On these grounds the defendant requests that the guilty verdicts be 
overturned and a new trial be granted. Further it is requested 
that at this new trial the defendant would be entitled to his 
lesser included instruction. 
SUBMITTED this ' day of September, 1995. 
jfSZbmi D. 0' CONNELL, JR. 
Attorney for Defendant/Appant 
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SALT LAKE CITY CODE 
12.52J50. Reckless Driving - Prohibited. 
Any person who drives any vehicle in 
wilful or wanton disregard for the safety of 
persons or property is guilty of reckless driving. 
Any person guilty of violating this section shall 
be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor. (Prior code 
Title 46, Art. 15 §222) 
12.52360. Reckless driving - Penalty. 
A. Every person convicted of any violation 
of Section 12.52 J 50, or its successor, shall be 
punished by imprisonment for a period of not 
less than five days nor more than six months or 
by a fine of not less than twenty-five dollars nor 
more than' one thousand dollars, or by both such 
fine and imprisonment 
B. On a second or subsequent conviction, 
the minimum term of imprisonment shall be not 
less than ten days, and the minimum fine not 
less than fifty dollars. (Prior code Title 46, Art 
15 J 223) 
12.24.100. Driving Under The Influence Of 
Drugs And Intoxicants Prohibited - Penalties. 
A. It is unlawful and punishable as 
provided in this section for any person to 
operate or be in actual physical control of a 
vehicle within this city if the person has a blood 
or breath alcohol content of .08 grams or greater 
by weight as shown by a chemical test given 
within two hours after the alleged operation or 
physical control, or if the person is under the 
influence of alcohol or any drug, or the 
combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a 
degree which renders the person incapable of 
safely driving a vehicle within the city. The fact 
that a person charged with violating this section 
is or has been legally entitled to use alcohol or a 
drug does not constitute a defense against any 
charge of violating this section. 
B. Percent by weight of alcohol in the 
blood shall be based upon grams of alcohol per 
one hundred cubic centimeters of blood, and the 
percent by weight alcohol in the breath shall be 
based upon grams of alcohol per two hundred 
ten liters of breath. 
C. Every person who is convicted the first 
time of a violation of subsection A of this 
section shall be guilty of a Class B 
misdemeanor. 
D. I. In addition to the penalties provided 
for in subsection C of this section, the court 
shall, upon a first conviction, impose either 
a. A mandatory jail sentence of not less 
than forty-eight consecutive hours nor more 
than two hundred forty hours, with emphasis on 
serving in the drunk tank of the jail; or 
b. Require the person to work in a 
community- service work program for not less 
than twenty-four hours nor more than fifty 
hours. 
2. in addition to the requirements of 
subsection Dla or Dlb above, the court shall 
order the person to participate in an assessment 
and educational series at a licensed alcohol 
rehabilitation facility, at the person's expense. 
E. 1. Upon a second conviction within five 
years after a first conviction under this section, 
in addition to the penalties provided for in 
subsection C, the court shall impose either 
a. A mandatory jail sentence of not less 
than two hundred forty consecutive hours nor 
more than seven hundred twenty hours, with 
emphasis on serving in the drunk tank of the 
jail; or 
b. Require the person to work in a 
community- service work program for not less 
than eighty hours nor more than two hundred 
forty hours. 
2. In addition to the requirements of 
subsection Ela or Elb above, the court shall 
order the person to participate in an assessment 
and educational series at a licensed alcohol 
rehabilitation facility, and the court may, in its 
discretion, order the person to obtain treatment 
at the person's expense at an alcohol 
rehabilitation facility. 
F. 1. Upon a subsequent conviction within 
five years after a second conviction under this 
section, in addition to the penalties provided for 
in subsection C, the court shall impose either 
a. A mandatory jail sentence of not less 
than seven hundred twenty nor more than two 
thousand one hundred sixty hours, with 
emphasis on serving in the drunk tank of the 
jail; or 
b. Require the person to work in a 
community- service work project for not less 
than eighty hours nor more than seven hundred 
twenty hours. 
G. In no event shall any combination of 
imprisonment and/or community service 
imposed under subsections C, D, E and F above 
exceed six months' duration. 
H. No portion of any sentence imposed 
under subsection C shall be suspended, and the 
convicted person shall not be eligible for parole 
or probation until such time as any sentence 
imposed under subsections D, E or F of this 
section has been served. 
1. 1. When the prosecution agrees to a plea 
of guilty or no contest to a charge of a violation 
of Section 12.52.350 of this title, or its 
successor, in satisfaction of, or as a substitute 
for, an original charge of a violation of this 
section, the prosecution shall state for the record 
a factual basis for the plea, including whether or 
not defendant had consumed alcohol or drugs, 
or a combination of both, in connection with the 
ofTense. The prosecutor's statement shall be an 
offer of proof of the facts which show whether 
or not defendant had consumed alcohol or 
drugs, or a combination of both, in connection 
with the offense. 
2. The court shall advise the defendant, 
before accepting the plea offered under 
subsection 11 above, of the consequences of a 
violation of Section 12.52 J 50 of this title, or its 
successor, in substance as follows: "If the court 
accepts the defendant's plea of guilty or no 
contest to a charge of violating said Section 
12.52 J50, and the prosecutor states for the 
record that there was consumption of alcohol or 
drugs, or a combination of both, by the 
defendant in connection with the offense, the 
resulting conviction shall be a prior offense for 
the purpose of subsections E and F of this 
section." 
J. A peace officer may, without a warrant, 
arrest a person for a violation of this section 
when: 
1. The violation is coupled with an 
accident or collision in which the person is 
involved; or 
2. The officer has reasonable cause to 
believe a violation has in fact been committed 
by the person, although not in the officer's 
presence. 
K. This Section 12.24.100 was enacted to 
be in harmony with and, in substance, the same 
as Section 41-6-44, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
as amended, or its successor. (Ord. 82-87 ( l f 
1987; prior code Title 46, Art 6 } 105) 
UTAH CONSTITUTION 
ARTICLE I . 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the 
right to appear and defend in person and by counsel, 
to demand the nature and cause of the accusation 
against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his 
own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against 
him, to have compulsory process to compel the atten-
dance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy 
public trial by an impartial jury of the county or dis-
trict in which the offense is alleged to have been com-
mitted, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judg-
ment, be compelled to advance money or fees to se-
cure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall 
not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a 
wife shall not be compelled to testify against her hus-
band, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any 
person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
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UNITED STATE CONSTITUTION 
AMENDMENT V 
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — 
Due process of law and just compensation 
clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or 
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment 
or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising 
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in 
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor 
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor shall private property 
be taken for public use, without just compensation. 
